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Abstract - This paper proposes a signature scheme where the signatures are generated by the 
cooperation of a number of people from a given group of senders and the signatures are verified 
by a certain number of people from the group of recipients. Shamir’s threshold scheme and 
Schnorr’s signature scheme are used to realize the proposed scheme. 
Key words - Threshold signature scheme, Lagrange interpolation, ElGamal Public key 
Cryptosystem and Threshold verification. 
1. Introduction 
Physical signature is a natural tool to authenticate the communication, but it is useless in electronic 
messages; one has to rely on other methods like digital signature. Digital signature is a cryptographic 
tool to solve this problem of authenticity in electronic communications.  Basically digital signature has a 
property that anyone having a copy of the signature can check its validity by using some public-
information, but no one else can forge the signature on another document. This property of digital 
signature is called self-authentication. In most situations, the signer and the verifier is generally a single 
person. However when the message is sent by one organization to another organization, a valid message 
may require the approval or consent of several people. In this case, the signature generation and 
verification is done by more than one consenting rather than by a single person. A common example of 
this policy is a large bank transaction, which requires the signature of more than one person. Such a 
policy could be implemented by having a separate digital signature for every required signer, but this 
solution increases the effort to verify the message linearly with the number of signer. Threshold 
signature is an answer to this problem. 
The (t , n) threshold signature schemes [1,2,3,5,6,8] are used to solve these problems.   Threshold 
signatures are closely related to the concept of threshold cryptography, first introduced by Desmedt [1,2]. 
In 1991 Desmedt and Frankel [1] proposed the first (t, n) threshold digital signature scheme based on the 
RSA assumption. 
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This paper proposes a Threshold signature scheme with threshold verification based on Shamir’s 
threshold signature scheme [10] and Schnorr’s signature scheme [9]. These basic tools are briefly 
described in the next section. 
The section-2 presents some basic tools. In Section-3 we present a Threshold Signature Scheme 
with threshold verification.  Section-4 discusses the security of the Scheme. An illustration to the 
scheme   is discussed in section-5.  Remarks are in section-6.  
2. Preliminaries         
   Throughout this paper we will use the following system setting.  
• A prime modulous p, where 2 511 <  p  < 2 512 ; 
• A prime modulous q, where 2 159 <  q  < 2 160 and q is a divisor of p – 1; 
• A number g, where   g      k (p –1) /q mod p, k is random integer with 1  k  p –1 such that g 
>1; (g is a generator of order q in Zp*
 
). 
• A collision free one-way hash function h [12]; 
The parameters p, q, g and h are common to all users. Every user has two keys one private and one 
public. We assume that a user A chooses a random Ax ∈ Zq and computes Ay  = Αxg   mod p. He keeps 
Ax  as his private key and publishes Ay  as his public key. 
  In Schnorr’s signature scheme the signature of the user A on the message m is given by 
( Ar , AS ), where,  Ar  =  h (g A
k
 mod p, m),   and
     AS    =  Ak  − Ax . Ar  mod p.  The signature are verified 
by checking the equality Ar   =  h ( g AS    y Ar  mod p , m ) . 
A (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme is a scheme to distribute a secret key K into n users in such 
a way that any t users can cooperate to reconstruct K but a collusion of t – 1 or less users reveal nothing 
about the secret. There are many realization of this scheme, we shall use Shamir’s scheme. This scheme is 
based on Lagrange interpolation in a field. To implement it, a polynomial f of degree t – 1 is randomly 
chosen in Zq such that f (0) = K. Each user i is given a public identity iu and a secret share f ( iu ). Now 
any subset of  t shareholders out of n shareholders can reconstruct the secret K =  f (0), by pooling their 
shares and using 
 
                       f (0)           =      q
uu
u
uf
ji
jt
ijj
t
i
i mod)(
,11 −
−∏
≠==
 
 
  Here for simplicity the authorized subset of t users consists of shareholders i for i =1,2,3…t. 
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3. The proposed scheme. 
The signer of the conventional digital signature schemes is usually a single person. But when the 
message is transmitted by an organization S to another organization R and may require the approval of 
more than one person then the responsibility of signing the messages needs to be shared by a subset HS of 
t or more signer from a designated group GS of n users belongs to the organization S. 
On the other hand, the signing group wants to generate the signature on a message m in such a way 
that the signature can be verified by any subset HR of k or more users from a designated group GR of l 
users belongs to the organization R, then threshold verification schemes serve our purpose. This paper 
proposes a threshold signature scheme with threshold verification.  
We assume that the secret key of the organization S is Sx and the public key is Sy  where Sy  = 
Sxg
 
 
mod p with Sx ∈ Zq. Similarly the organization R possesses a pair ( Rx , Ry ) of private key Rx  and public 
key Ry  = Rxg  mod p. Also every user A in both the organizations possesses a pair ( Ax , Ay ) with Ax  
secret and Ay  = Α
xg
 
 mod p public. 
We further assume that both the organization R and S have a common trusted center (CTC) for 
determining the group secret parameters of the two groups and also the secret shares all members. This 
scheme consists of the following steps: -  
3.1. Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation for the organization S. 
(a). CTC selects the group public parameters p , q , g and a collision free one way hash 
function h. CTC also selects for the group GS a polynomial  
                  f S(x) = a0 + a1x +….a t-1 x t- 1 mod q, with  a0     =   Sx     =   f S(0). 
(b). CTC computes the group public key, Sy , as,  Sy   =   g  f S(0) mod p. 
(c). CTC randomly selects K  ∈ Zq and computes a public value W =   g K− mod p. 
(d). CTC computes a public value
iSv   for each member of the group GS , as, 
iSv  =    fS ( iSu ). 
K
Siy  mod p. 
 Here,
iSy is public key and iSu  is the public value associated with each user i in the group GS. 
(e). CTC sends {
iSv  , W } to each user i in the group GS through a public channel. 
3.2. Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation for the organization R 
(a). CTC selects for the group GR  a polynomial     
 f R(x) = b0 + b1x +….b k -1 x k   -1 mod q with  b0     =    Rx     =   f R(0). 
(b). CTC computes the group public key, Ry , as, Ry    =     g  fR (0) mod p. 
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(c). CTC computes a public value
iR
v
 
for each member of the group GR , as, 
iR
v =   fR ( iRu ). 
K
Ri
y  mod p. 
       Here,
iR
y is public key and 
iR
u
 
is the public value associated with each user i in the group GR. 
(d). CTC sends {
iR
v , W} to each user i in the group GR   through a public channel. 
3.3. Signature generation by any t users 
If a HS is subset of t members of the organization S out of n members who agree to sign a 
message m to be sent to the organization R, then the signature generation has the following steps. 
(a). Each user i  ∈ HS randomly selects 1iK and 2iK  ∈  Zq and computes   
          ui     =  g 2iK− mod p, vi      =   g 1iK  mod p  and  wi        =   g 1iK  Ry 2i
K
 mod p. 
(b). Each user i broadcasts ui  , wi  publicly and vi  secretly to every other user in HS . Once all ui ,vi 
and  wi are available, each member  i ,i ∈ HS computes  the product US , VS  ,WS and a 
hash value RS ,as, 
                     US          =      qu
SHi
i mod∏
∈
,    VS     =     qv
SHi
i mod∏
∈
,  
                     WS      =       qw
SHi
i mod∏
∈
and RS    =       h (VS  ,m) mod q. 
(c). Each user i ∈ HS  recovers his/her secret share  fS ( iSu ) , as,  fS ( iSu )   =   iSv iS
xW mod  p. 
(d). Each user i ∈ HS  modifies his/her shadow, as, iSMS   =    fS ( iSu ) . quu
u
ji
j
SS
St
ijj
mod
,1 −
−∏
≠=
. 
(e). By using his/her modified shadow
iSMS , each user i ∈ HS computes his/her partial signature 
si ,as,   si   = 1iK   +   iSMS .R S mod q. 
(f). Each user i  ∈ HS sends his/her partial signature to the CTC, who produce a group signature SS 
, as,  SS     =    
=
t
i ,1
si mod q. 
(g). CTC sends { SS , US ,WS  , m} to the designated combiner DC of organization R as signature 
of the group S for the message m. 
3.4. Signature verification by the organization R 
Any subset HR of k users from a designated group GR can verify the signature. We assume that 
there is designated combiner DC (can be any member among the members of the group GR, or 
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the head of the organization R), who collects partial computations from each user in HR and 
determines the validity of signature. The verifying process is as follows. 
(a) Each user i ∈ HR recovers his/her secret share, as,  fR ( iRu )  =  iRv iR
xW mod  p. 
(b) Each user i ∈ HR modifies his/her shadow, as, iRMS  =     fR ( iRu ) . quu
u
ji
i
RR
R
k
ijj
mod
,1 −
−∏
≠=
. 
(c) Each user i ∈ HR sends his modified shadow iRMS to the DC. DC computes RR , as, 
  RR     =       

=
k
i
iRMS
SS UW
1
. mod q
    
and recovers   RS   =   h (  RR     ,  m) mod q. 
(d). DC checks the following congruence g SS   ≡
?
  RR. S
R
Sy  mod p for a valid signature. 
       If hold then { SS , US , WS  ,  m} is a valid signature on the message m. 
4. Security discussions. 
In this sub-section, we shall discuss the security aspects of proposed Threshold Signature Scheme 
with threshold verification. Here we shall discuss several possible attacks. But none of these can 
successfully break our system. 
(a). Can any one retrieve the organization’s secret keys Sx  =   f S (0) and Rx  =  f R (0),from the 
group public key Sy and Ry  respectively ?  
This is as difficult as solving discrete logarithm problem. No one can get the secret key 
Sx and Rx , since f S and f R   are the randomly and secretly selected polynomials by the CTC.  On 
the other hand, by using the public keys Sy and Ry  no one also get the secret keys Sx  and 
Rx because this is as difficult as solving discrete logarithm problem. 
(b). Can one retrieve the secret shares, fS  ( iSu )  of members of  GS  ,  from the equation 
                           
iSv =   fS ( iSu ). 
K
Siy  mod  p  ?  
No because fS is a randomly and secretly selected polynomial and K is also a randomly and 
secretly selected integer by the CTC. Similarly no one can get the secret shares   fR ( iRu ) of 
members of GR  , from the equation  iRv   =   fR ( iRu ). 
K
Ri
y  mod  p. 
(c). Can one retrieve the secret shares, fS ( iSu ) of members of  GS  ,  from the equation 
                                                          fS ( iSu )  =   iSv iS
xW mod  p  ?  
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Only the user i can recovers his secret shares, fS ( iSu ), because fS is a randomly and secretly 
selected polynomial and
iSx  is secret key of the user i∈ GS. Similarly no one can get the secret 
shares   fR ( iRu ) of members of  GR  , from the equation   fR ( iRu ) = iRv iR
xW mod  p. 
(d). Can one retrieve the modified shadow
iSMS , integer 1iK  , the hash value RS and partial 
signature si ,i ∈ GS   from the equation si  = 1iK   +   iSMS .R S mod q  ? 
They all are secret parameters and it is computationally infeasible for a forger to collect 
the
iSMS , integer 1iK , the hash value RS   and partial signature si ,i ∈ GS .   
(e). Can the designated CTC retrieve any partial information from the equation, 
                                      SS   =   
=
t
i ,1
si mod q   ? 
Obviously, it would be computationally infeasible for CTC to derive any information from si. 
(f). Can one impersonate a member i ,i ∈ HS  ? 
A forger may try to impersonate a shareholder i ,i ∈ HS ,  by randomly selecting  two integers 
1i
K and
2i
K ∈ Zq and broadcasting ui , vi   and  wi.. But without knowing the secret shares, fS 
(
iSu ), it is difficult to generate a valid partial signature si to satisfy the verification equation, 
SS  =    
=
t
i ,1
si mod q    and     g SS     ≡
?
   RR. S
R
Sy  mod  p. 
(g). Can one forge a signature {SS ,US ,WS ,m} by the following equation,                                                                                                     
g SS            ≡            RR. SRSy  mod p? 
A forger may randomly selects an integer RR and then computes the hash value   RS such 
that   RS      =     h (RR  , m) mod q. 
Obviously, to computes the integer SS  is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm 
problem. On the other hand, the forger can randomly select RR and SS  first and then try to 
determine a value RS , that satisfy the equation g SS  ≡   RR. SRSy  mod  p. 
   However, according to the one-way property of the hash function h, it is quite impossible. 
Thus, this attack will not be successful. 
(h). Can t or more shareholders act in collusion to reconstruct the polynomial fS (x) ? 
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   According to the equation fS (x)   =   q
uu
ux
uf
jSiS
jSt
ijj
t
i
iSS mod)(
,11 −
−∏
≠==
,the secret 
polynomial fS (x) can be reconstructed with the knowledge of any t secret shares, fS ( iSu ),  i ∈ GS  
. So if in an organization the shareholders are known to each other, any t of them may collude 
and find the secret polynomial fS. This attack, however, does not weaken the security of 
our scheme in the sense that the number of users that have to collude in order to forge the 
signature is not smaller than the threshold value.  
5. Illustration 
We now give an illustration in support of our scheme. Suppose =SG 7,  =SH  4,  =RG 6 and 
=SH  5. We take the parameters   p  =   47,  q  = 23 and  g  =  2. 
5.1. Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation for the organization S 
(a). CTC selects for the group GS ,a polynomial   f S (x)  =  11 + 3x +13 x 2  + x 3 mod 23. Here     
Sx  =  11 and  Sy  =   2
11
 mod 47  =   27. 
(b). CTC randomly selects K  =  8 and computes W  =  2 - 8   mod 47  =   9.   
(c). CTC computes the secret key, public key, secret share and public value
 
for each 
member of the group GS , as shown by the following table. 
 
 
 
5.2.Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation for the organization R 
(a). CTC selects for the group GR  a  polynomial  f R(x)  = 7 + 2x + 4 x 2  + 3 x 3 mod 23. Here        
Rx  =   7  and  Ry  =  2
7  mod 47  =  34.                                                  
(b). CTC computes the secret key, public key, secret share and public value
 
for each member 
of the group GR , as shown by the next table. 
      VALUE 
USER 
     
iSy       iSx       iSu     fS ( iSu )       iSv  
User – S1     7        12        2        8      34 
User – S2       37        10        9        3      34 
User – S3       28        14        8       22      38 
User – S4       18        16      11        4       9 
User – S5         8        21       3        3       6 
User – S6         3        19       5       16       6 
User – S7       36        17       4       19      40 
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5.3. Signature generation by any t users 
If S2, S4, S6 and S7 are agree to sign a message m for the organization R , then  
(a). S2 selects 12K  =    5 , 22K   =   7 and computes   u2   =  18, v2     =  32  and  w2    =  21. 
(b). S4  selects  14K  =   4 , 24K  =   3 and computes  u4    =   6,  v4     =   16  and  w4     =   4. 
(c). S6 selects 16K = 12, 26K = 18 and computes u6 = 32, v6 = 7 and w6 = 1. 
(d). S7   selects 17K  =   21, 27K   =   11 and computes  u7     =  7, v7     =  12 and  w7    =  17.        
             (e). Each users computes  US   = 34, VS  =  3, WS   =    18 and RS  =   h (  3 , m )  = 8 (let).                                                           
             (f). S2 recovers   fS ( 2Su )  = 3 and computes        2SMS    =    5   and  s2    =  22. 
             (g). S4 recovers fS ( 4Su )   =  4  and computes   4SMS    =   21  and  s4   =    11. 
             (i).  S6 recovers  fS ( 6Su )  =  16  and computes    6SMS    =    12  and  s6   =    16. 
             (j).  S7 recovers  fS ( 7Su )   =  19  and computes    7SMS     =   19  and   s7   =     12. 
             (k). CTC produces a group signature SS  =  15 and sends { 15 , 34 , 18  , m} to the designated 
combiner DC of organization R as signature of the group S for the message m. 
5.4. Signature verification by the organization R 
   Suppose five users R1 , R3 , R4 , R5 and R6 want to verify the signature, then 
(a). R1
       
recovers    fR ( 1Ru )    =   21 and computes    1RMS        =       19. 
(b). R3
     
 recovers   fR ( 3Ru )     =   21 and computes   3RMS         =         4. 
(c). R4   recovers     fR ( 4Ru )    =   15  and computes 4RMS          =       11. 
(d). R5   recovers    fR ( 5Ru )     =   12  and computes  5RMS         =         9. 
(e). R6     recovers     fR ( 6Ru )    =   18    and computes 6RMS        =        10. 
VALUE 
USER 
      
iR
y
 
    
iR
x
 
     
iR
u
 
   fR ( iRu )      iRv  
User – R1        9       15       11        21        14 
User – R2      42         9        5          9        25 
User – R3      27       11        8        21        16 
User – R4      25       18        3        15        20 
User – R5      17        6        6         6        24 
User – R6      14       13             4        18        32 
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(f). DC computes the value RR   =  3 and then recovers RS   =   h ( 3 , m ) = 8.                                                
(g). DC checks the following congruence for a valid signature  2 15    ≡
?
    3
 
.  27 8 mod 45. 
                 This congruence holds so {15, 34
 
,18
  
, m} is a valid signature on  the message m . 
6.Remarks 
In this paper, we have proposed a threshold signature scheme with threshold verification. To 
obtain this construction, we have used the ElGamal public key cryptosystem and Schnorr’s signature 
scheme. The security of this cryptosystem is based on the discrete log problem. The signature generation 
is done by certain designated sub – groups of signers and the verification is done by certain designated 
sub-groups of the group of the receivers. Here designated sub – groups are characterized by threshold 
values. The threshold value can be different for signature generation and for signature verification. Until t 
(the threshold value of the group of senders) individuals act in collusion they will get no information 
about the group secret key. Similarly, until k (the threshold value of the group of recipients) individuals 
act in collusion they will get no information about the group secret key. The group public parameters p, q, 
g and a collision free one-way hash function h is same for both the organizations. 
In any case of dispute between the group S and R, the CTC keeps the records of signatures and plays 
the role of a trusted judge. Since the CTC can checks the validity of the signature so when any third party 
needs the signature verification, the CTC convince the third party about the facts. 
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